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NOTES
THE ATTORNEY'S DUTIES OF DISCLOSURE
Introduction
A few years ago, in the case of In re Greenberg,1 Chief Justice
Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme Court made the statement
that "counsel is responsible . . .for making known to the court any
decisions in the State adverse to his cause in the event his opponent
fails to cite them .. ." 2 Taken at face value, this means that the
attorney is not fulfilling his ethical duty if he deliberately presents a
one-sided picture of the law applicable to the fact situation being
litigated. At first appearance, this seems to be an extremist position,
and one without foundation in the Canons of Professional Ethics,
which are at least the immediate source of the attorney's standards.
But, in reality, all duties of disclosure can be traced to an origin in the
Commandment, which directs us to be truthful in all our dealings with
other men.3 Further, these Canons, as standards of conduct, would
seem to have been derived as particular applications of the moral law.
The very word "Canon" itself suggests a derivation from the prin-
ciples which controlled the conduct of the ecclesiastical authorities
when much of the administration of justice was in their hands.4
Thus, it can be seen that the obligation as proclaimed by Chief
Justice Vanderbilt at least has a basis in the moral law. But a study
of the obligations of disclosure already enumerated by the Canons, and
,presently enforced by the courts and the various bar associations will
show that this apparently recent development also comes within the
purview of the Canons, implicitly at least, as a logical and necessary
corollary of these other obligations of disclosure.
Development of Professional Standards
The practice of the law was not recognized as a profession from
the very beginnings of recorded history; 5 hence, there was not always
a need for a special code to regulate the conduct of the men who advo-
cated the cause of others before the courts. Historians tell us that
the earliest practitioners, at least in England, were not what could be
' 15 N.J. 132, 104 A.2d 46 (1954).
2 In re Greenberg, 15 N.J. 132, 104 A.2d 46, 48 (1954) (emphasis added).
3 "You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor." ExoDus 20:16.
4 Webster defines a canon as "a decree, decision, regulation, code, or con-
stitution made by ecclesiastical authority ... ." WE~STR's Ntw INERNATIONM.A
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1938).
5 See PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COmImO LAW 204 (4th ed.
1948); 1 PoLLoCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORtY OF ENGLISu LAW 213 (2d ed.
1899); WiLrKIN, THE SPmIT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSi&N 8-9 (1938). Holds-
worth tells us that it was not until the reign of Edward I (late thirteenth
century) that there arose a class of professional attorneys. 2 HOLDSwORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 317 (4th ed. 1936).
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properly called professional men.6 Rather, they were learned and
capable men who merely appeared in court on behalf of a friend or
relation.7 As the evolutionary development of the law continued and
its complexities multiplied, however,8 a need for trained specialists to
respond to the new demand became apparent. There thus arose a
group of professional advocates who derived their right to practice
law from the kingY Today, then, it is well recognized that the prac-
tice of law is a privilege conferred upon the attorney by the state,10
as successor of the powers of the king.
With the arrival of legal practice at a stage of development where
it was considered a profession, a need for uniform regulation of the
conduct of members of the bar became apparent. 1  The restrictions
which have been most obviously necessary have been provided by
criminal laws.1 2 But there is another area which has not been covered
by law, and it is this area which the profession itself seeks to regulate
through self-discipline.
The Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion and of the bar associations of the individual states constitute the
core of these principles of self-discipline. These Canons guide the
attorney's conduct in the many professional relationships into which
he enters. Though the most obvious of these relationships is that of
attorney-client, the practice of law involves other equally important
relationships, such as those with the opposing counsel, with the court,
with the public, and with the profession itself. Because the practice
of law is a privilege emanating from the state, however, the courts
have a rightful claim to the primary loyalty of the attorney, whom
they describe as an "officer of the court." 13
6 See HOLP SWORrH, op. cit. supra note 5; PLUCKNErr, Op. cit. spra note 5;
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. stnpra note 5.
7 PLUCKNETr, op. cit. supra note 5, at 205.
8 Ibid.
9"... . we see a group of counsel, of serjeants and apprentides on the one
hand, and a group of professional attorneys on the other, and both of them
derive their right to practice from the king either mediately or immediately."
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 5, at 217.
10 See RuLEs OF THE NFw YORK STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS (as
amended May 1, 1956). See also N.Y. PEN. LAw § 270, which makes it un-
lawful to practice or appear as an attorney "without having first been duly and
regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this
state ... "
11 "... it is peculiarly essential tlhat the system for establishing and dis-
pensing Justice be developed to a high point of efficiency and so maintained
that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of its administration." Preamble, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE
NEw YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1950).
12 E.g., N.Y. PEN. LAw §§ 320 (barratry), 376, 376-a, 377 (embracery),
379 (bribing witnesses), 1620-34 (perjury and subornation of perjury).
13 "An attorney at law is an officer of court . . . . [with] obligations both
public and private." Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 206 N.W. 181, 190
(1925). See also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1866) ; Bowles
v. United States, 50 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1931) ; People v. Gorman, 346 Ill.
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It is upon this premise, and the obligation of all men to be
truthful, that the attorney's duties of full disclosure of both law and
fact are predicated. Thus, Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics provides a general guide for the attorney in this area. It states
that "the conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other
lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness." 14 In addi-
tion, several other Canons impose a duty of disclosure in particular
situations." But all of these Canons are worded generally, and it
consequently is necessary that they be interpreted and applied so as
"to assist the practitioners of the law in maintaining the highest
standards of ethical conduct as they are daily confronted with the
problems of their profession." 16 In order to understand and apply
the standards of conduct regarding disclosure to particular situations
it is necessary to look to the applicable case law and to the opinions
of Committees on Professional Ethics of the bar associations, which
are "representative groups of experienced lawyers to whom members
of the profession .. . submit their ethical problems for considered
advice and opinion." 17
An Exception-The Attorney-Client Privilege
Before beginning an inquiry into the ethical obligations of dis-
closure imposed on the attorney, it is necessary to state that certain
facts are exempt from the general rule that all material facts must be
brought forth. "[C] onfidential communications between an attorney
and his client are privileged from disclosure ... as a rule of necessity
in the administration of justice." 18 In New York State, the Civil
Practice Act extends this privilege of non-disclosure to attorneys and
their employees so long as the information being withheld was ac-
quired by them "in the course of [their] professional employment." 19
This exception to the general rule is itself subject to a few ex-
ceptions, at least from the point of view of ethics. The Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association,
432, 178 N.E. 880, 885 (1931); Danforth v. Egan, 23 S.D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021,
1024 (1909).
14 Canon 22, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
15 E.g., Canon 5: "The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible."
Canon 29: "The counsel upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been
committed owe it to the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the
knowledge of the prosecuting authorities." Canon 41: "When a lawyer dis-
covers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has unjustly
imposed upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it ...."
16 OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AssociA-
TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEw YORK COUNTY
LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION xi (1956).
17 Id. at viii.
is United States v. Funk, 84 F. Supp. 967. 968 (E.D. Kv. 1949).
'N.Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 353.
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in several of its opinions, has indicated that this strict confidence may
be broken if it is necessary to do so in order to defend against unjust
charges,20 or to prevent prospective crime.
21
As a matter of first impression, it might seem that this privilege
of non-disclosure actually impedes the proper administration of justice
in that it hinders the full and complete disclosure of all relevant facts.
But this exception has a sound basis in public policy. The Committee
on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Associa-
tion has pinpointed this consideration, stating that "it is essential to
the administration of justice that there should be perfect freedom of
consultation by client with attorney without any apprehension of a
compelled disclosure by the attorney to the detriment of the client." 22
Ditties of Disclosure-Facts
Though the duty of an attorney to make a full disclosure of the
law of the state applicable- to particular fact situations may be con-
sidered fairly novel, the duty to present to the court all the facts has
long been recognized. 23 This duty to disclose facts is applicable to
tasks performed by an attorney before and after, as well as during.
the conduct of a trial. Thus, the direction to use candor and fairness
before the court and with other lawyers imposes the duty of truthful-
ness upon the attorney in the performance of such duties as the
drawing of pleadings and motion papers, the arguing of motions, the
selection of a jury, the examination of witnesses, and the preparation
and argument of briefs on appeal.
Certain facts must be established before an attorney is ethically
entitled to proceed with a cause of action. Since we operate under
the principle of res judicata, 24 a cause which has once been finally
adjudicated between the parties may not be again re-litigated. 25 Thus.
an attorney is imposing upon the court if he attempts to proceed with
the trial of a cause that has already been decided. Similarly, the fail-
ure to disclose the pendency of an action in another court, based on
the same subject matter, may also be considered an imposition. In
addition to the general standard prescribed by Canon 22, the bringing
of actions in both of these instances can be said to be specifically
2 0 Opinions 19 and 202, OPINIONS OF THE A.B.A. CommIrrEE ON PROFEs-
SIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES 94, 405 (1946).
21 Opinion 202, op. cit. supra note 20, at 405.
22 Opinion 91, op. cit. supra note 20, at 201.
23 See, e.g., In re Glover, 176 Minn. 519, 223 N.W. 921 (1929) (per curiam)
In re Marron, 22 N.M. 252, 160 Pac. 391 (1916); In re Abrams, 36 Ohio App.
384, 173 N.E. 312 (1930) ; In re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939).
24 See Heyman v. Heyman, 175 Misc. 69, 72, 22 N.Y.S.?d 832, 835 (Sup. Ct.
1940); Buffalo Fire Appliance Corp. v. City of Norwich, 156 Misc. 486, 487,
281 N.Y. Supp. 939, 941 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Ward v. Charlton, 177 Va. 101,
12 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1941).
2- Foster v. The Richard Busteed, 100 Mass. 409, 412 (1868).
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forbidden by Canon 30, which prohibits unjustifiable litigation.2 6 At
least one court has squarely faced the question whether concealment of
a prior adjudication constitutes a fraud upon the court, showing the
attorney to be unworthy to practice law. The question was answered
in the affirmative, and the attorney's license to practice law was
suspended.2 7  In another case, involving an action for annulment, an
attorney was censured for failing to disclose the pendency of a sep-
aration action between the same litigants.2  Although this problem
has appeared infrequently in disciplinary actions, the stand taken
when it has arisen would indicate that courts do recognize this duty
of disclosure.
Once the attorney has reached the court, he has the further duty
to ensure that any potential bias on the part of jurors or witnesses,
known to him, will be disclosed. The Constitution of the United
States guarantees to its citizens, in certain instances, the right to a
trial by an impartial jury.29 The obligation of securing such an im-
partial panel should rest on all the parties involved in the litigation.
This impartiality is secured in part by the right given by law to the
attorneys to challenge a certain number of prospective jurors per-
emptorily 20 or for cause.3' But this alone cannot solve the problem.
There remains the possibility that certain jurors will be empanelled
even though they are bound to one of the attorneys by bonds of blood,
friendship, or business, since the opposing attorney may very well be
unaware of the existence of such bonds. It is in this instance that
the attorney has the obligation to come forth and declare to the court
the existence of such a relationship. This situation arose in the
disciplinary proceeding of In re Shon 32 in New York. There the
attorney was disbarred for, inter alia, allowing two close friends to
sit as jurors in the trial of a case which he was handling, without
disclosing that fact to the court.
The Committee on Professional Ethics of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York was confronted with a similar situation
in a problem submitted for its consideration.33 The question asked
was whether it was professionally proper for an attorney to fail to
disclose that a prospective juror was an employee of a corporation
linked to his corporate client through an interlocking directorate. In
26 "The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense
when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite
party or to work oppression or wrong." Canon 30, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS.
27 People v. Case, 241 Ill. 279, 89 N.E. 638 (1909).
28 In re Heimsoth, 255 N.Y. 409, 175 N.E. 112 (1931) (per curiam).
29 U.S. CoNsT.. amends. VI, VII; see also N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
30 N.Y. CrV. PRAC. ACT § 451.
31 N.Y. CrV. PRAc. ACT § 452.
.32 262 App. Div. 225, 28 N.Y.S.2d 872 (2d Dep't 1941).
33 Opinion 217, OPINIONS OF THE COMMIErES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEv Yom
CouNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION 107 (1956).
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responding in the negative, the Committee declared that withholding
such information is unfair to the court, to the opposing attorney, and
to the litigant, and hence clearly unethical.
But the possibility of bias, far from being confined to jurors,
is more likely encountered in witnesses. The 1 osition of the witness
in our judicial structure is, to a certain extent, anomalous. For, al-
though it is known to all that he is being called to testify in the
furtherance of one of the conflicting causes, yet he, like all of the
participants in a judicial proceeding, has the primary obligation to see
that the ends of justice are met.
Ordinarily, jurors are the ultimate judges as to the credibility of
a witness, and how much weight should be attached to the facts he
has brought forth.3 4 Realizing that witnesses are partisan, at least to
the extent that the facts which are within their knowledge favor one
particular side, it becomes the jurors' task to sift and weigh all of the
factors involved in the' presentation of testimony by the witness.
Physical appearance, composure or lack thereof, nervous mannerisms
-all of these factors are bound to affect the manner in which the
jurors consider the witnesses' testimony. But the important point to.
keep in mind is that the jurors, as the arbiters of facts, must have all
factors bearing on the credibility Qf witnesses brought to their atten-
tion before an intelligent and fair appraisal can be handed down. It
is for this reason that counsel is obliged to reveal whether a witness
is being compensated for his testimony, since if compensation is in-
volved it is reasonable to assume that such testimony will be, at the
very least, channelled in a favorable direction.
The Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York City
Bar Association has, in two of its opinions,35 declared it to be un-
ethical on the part of counsel to allow a witness to testify on his
client's behalf without disclosing to the court the fact that the witness
is either monetarily or otherwise being compensated for the testimony.
Although this failure to disclose has been found by courts to be re-
versible error, there are few cases 36 in which this failure to disclose
has formed the basis of a disbarment proceeding. However, in New
York State, there are at least two significant decisions in this area.
In the case of In re Schapiro3  decided in 1911, the defendant
attorney, having brought forth a doctor as a witness in a personal
injury action, was disbarred for remaining silent when the doctor
denied to the court that he had any pecuniary interest in the outcome
of the case, when in fact there had been an agreement that the doctor
was to have a percentage share in the recovery. The case of People
34 RiCHARDSoN, EVIDENCE §§ 123, 125 (8th ed. 1955). For instances when
this is not so, see RICHARDSON, op. cit. supra §§ 116-26.
3s Opinions 8 and 505, op. cit. sispra note 33, at 5-6, 276-77.
36 See, e.g., People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853 (1956);
cf. People v. Creasy, 236 N.Y. 205, 140 N.E. 563 (1923).
37 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y. Supp. 852 (1st Dep't 1911).
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v. Savvides,3 8 though not a disciplinary proceeding, is a more recent
expression of the courts' attitude in this area. Here, the defendant
was convicted on the testimony of a witness for the prosecution who
had been promised lenient treatment by an Assistant District Attorney
in return for his testimony. At the trial, the witness denied that there
was any agreement that he was to receive lenient treatment. The
court held that the failure of the Assistant District Attorney to expose
this lie by the witness was "'error so fundamental, so substantial,'
that a verdict of guilt will not be permitted to stand." 39 In addition
to the possibility of bias mentioned earlier, the court found that an
additional, and at least equally important reason for requiring dis-
closure of this fact is that since the witness himself had concealed the
fact that he was to be rewarded for his testimony, that act of con-
cealment should be taken into consideration by the jury in evaluating
the worth of the balance of his testimony.40 Thus, it would appear
that both the courts and committees on professional ethics have taken
a definite stand regarding an attorney's duty to disclose facts which
are pertinent to the question of possible bias by jurors and witnesses.
Another problem which may arise in the course of a trial involves
the misstatement of fact on the witness stand on the part of an attor-
ney's own witness. When this occurs, it is recognized that the
witness himself, if discovered, can be prosecuted and punished for
perjury.41  What, however, is the responsibility imposed upon the
attorney to correct such misstatements when and if they are known
by him to be false? If the misstatements made by a witness are
pursuant to instructions given to him by the attorney, the latter is
guilty of a violation of professional ethics, 42 and is also liable to be
criminally prosecuted for subornation of perjury.4
These situations require little further discussion because they are
specifically covered by either penal statutes or Canons of Professional
Ethics. There is, however, one situation which, while not accom-
panied by criminal sanctions, does pose a difficult ethical problem.
Ordinarily, when an attorney proceeds to trial, he should be com-
pletely familiar with the facts of his case and with the statements
which his witnesses and his client are going to make to the court. In
the regular course of events these are the facts and the statements
which will be repeated under oath in the actual trial. But it might
38 1 N.Y.2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853 (1956).
39 People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854 (1956).
40 Id. at 557, 136 N.E.2d at 855.
41 "A person is guilty of perjury who . ., kti6wingly testifies ... falsely,
or states in his testimony . . . any matter to be true which he knows to be
false... ." N.Y. PEiN. LAW § 1620.42 
"It is unprofessionable and dishonorable to deal other than candidly with
the facts ir taking the statements of witnesses .... " Canon 22, CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHics.-
43 "A person who wilfully procures or induces another to commit perjury
in the first degree is guilty of- subornation of perjury...." N.Y. PEN. -LAW
§ 1632.
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happen that a witness on the stand would contradict, or at least vary
the statements which he had previously made to his attorney. When
the attorney knows the statements originally made to be the true ones,
can he remain silent, or must it be pointed out to the court that his
witness's story has been, at the very least, inconsistent?
It would be well to remark at this point that we are here con-
cerned with statements made by witnesses, which the attorney
positively knows to be false. Were it merely a case of the attorney
suspecting perjury on the part of his witness, it would reduce itself
to a matter of the attorney usurping the jury's prerogative of judging
the credibility of witnesses, something which no canon of ethics would
or could require him to do.
The problem would be difficult enough to solve merely from the
ethical point of view; it is further complicated by the rules of evidence
which concern the impeaching of witnesses. Where adverse witnesses
are involved, they may be impeached. 44 As to one's own witnesses,
however, the rule is that ordinarily their credibility cannot be im-
peached. 456 In New York, this has been modified by statute. The
New York Civil Practice Act 46 and the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure 47 both provide that an attorney may disclose inconsistent
statements. on the part of his own witnesses when the prior statements
were made in writing or under oath. Further, if his witness's testi-
mony takes him by surprise, he may "interrogate the witness in respect
to previous statements inconsistent with the present testimony, for the
purpose of refreshing or probing his recollection, and of giving him an
opportunity to explain the apparent inconsistency." 48
"By proceeding with the trial after having become aware of the
fact that it was based upon perjured testimony, the attorney . . .
[makes] himself a party to the attempted fraud upon the court .... ,,49
Thus, it seems that the perjuring witness and his attorney (provided
he had knowledge of the perjury) are considered as being in pari
delicto. This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that a failure
to convict the witness of perjury will, of necessity, free the attorney
from any responsibility for his wrong. Perjury, being a criminal
44 See Hanrahan v. New York Edison Co., 238 N.Y. 194, 144 N.E. 499(1924) ; RICHARDSON, EvmENC § 523 (8th ed. 1955).
45 See People v. DeMartini, 213 N.Y. 203, 214, 107 N.E. 501, 505 (1914);
Pollock v. Pollock, 71 N.Y. 137, 152 (1877); Thompson v. Blanchard, 4 N.Y.
303, 311 (1850); RICHARsoN, op. cit. su~pra note 44, § 520; 3 WiGmoRE,
EVIDENCE §§ 896-901 (3d ed. 1940).
46 N.Y. CiV. PRAC. AcT § 343-a.
47 N.Y. CoDE CRIm. PRoc. § 8-a.
48 RICHARDSON, op. cit. supra note 44, § 522; cf. WIGMORE, op. cit. suapra note
45, § 1044.49 In re Hardenbrook, 135 App. Div. 634, 643-44, 121 N.Y. Supp. 250, 258(1st Dep't 1909). But see CONNELL, MORALS IN PoLIrTcs AND PROrSSIONS 112
(1951) where Father Connell opines that "if a witness for the defence, without
the foreknowledge or connivance of the lawyer, gives false testimony, the
lawyer has no obligation to point out the perjury."
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charge, must be supported by a finding of wrongful intent and guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt before a conviction can be sustained. 0 A
disbarment proceeding, on the other hand, is civil in nature, and re-
quires only a finding by a fair preponderance of the evidence that a
prescribed act has been committed or omitted.51 In fact, disciplinary
suspensions and censures have been sustained by- the courts on a mere
showing that the defendant negligently made a serious error of omis-
sion or commission. 52
However, the attorney's obligation to make a complete disclosure
of material facts does not end with the completion of the trial. Just
as it would be wrong to produce non-existent facts in the trial, so it
is wrong to present disputed facts on appeal, leading the court to be-
lieve that they were established in the trial court when in reality they
were not. In the disciplinary proceeding of In re Greenberg,5 3 that
is the precise violation with which the attorney was charged.
Duties of Disclosure-Law
From the obligations already outlined, it would seem but a short
step to the obligation mentioned at the beginning of this article, that
of disclosing decisions adverse to the client's cause, when they are
known to counsel. If there be resistance to this precept, it can prob-
ably be traced to the influence of the old idea that litigation is a game,
and the opposing counsel are adversaries. 5 4  This concept, far from
archaic, is still with us today 5 5 and may well be at the root of the
problem.
This idea, regarding litigation as a game, is clearly erroneous if
the purpose of the court system really is to dispense justice. For, if
it is wrong to cite an overruled case,56 because it leads the court to
decide on the basis of what is no longer law, it would seem equally
wrong for a case to be decided upon a consideration of only a part of
the applicable authority. Further, since the suppression of facts is an
50 N.Y. Coan Cim . Paoc. § 389; R=cHAansON, EvwnxCE § 97 (8th ed. 1955);
9 WIGoaRz, EViDENcE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).51 RicHARDsoN, op. cit. snipra note 50, § 97; WIGmoan, op. cit. supra n6te 50,
§ 2498.
52 See, e.g., Matter of O'Neill, 175 App. Div. 973, 161 N.Y. Supp. 899 (1st
Dep't 1916) ; In re McKenna, 100 Cal. 540, 107 P2d 258 (1940) (per curiam);
Trusty v. State Bar of California, 100 Cal. 501, 107 P2d 10 (1940).
53 15 N.J. 132, 104 A.2d 46 (1954).
54 See DRiNKER, LEGAL. ETHics 76 (1953) ; Quisuinbing, The Rights of the
Accused-Their True Basis, 2 Fm.Ncisco Cou. . . 12, 19,(1955).
55 For example, Norberto Quisumbing, Chief of the Prosecution Division
of the Department of Justice of the Philippines, feels that a trial is a "judicial
contest" in which the State isn't interested in discovering the truth, but rather
in settling'the dispute betveen the parties on the basis of "what the facts appear
to be as disclosed by the materials submitted by the parties." Quisumbing,
.supra note 54, at 19.56 Canon 22, CANONS oF PROFEssIONAL E'mcs.
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acknowledged wrong,57 there is at least equal reason for so regarding
the suppression of law. But the trend over the last thirty-five years,
at least as indicated by the courts and the bar associations, clearly is
toward recognition of the duty to disclose adverse holdings. In an
important English case,58 decided in the House of Lords in 1921, the
Lord Chancellor said that the House required, even insisted, that au-
thorities bearing one way or the other as to the subject matter of the
litigation should be brought to the attention of the court by anyone
who knows of them. 59
When the committees on ethics have been asked to hand down
opinions on this matter, their responses have unanimously favored
disclosure. For example, the Committee on Professional Ethics of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has ruled that
an attorney must disclose "an authoritative decision on all fours
against his client," 60 which he happened to uncover in the course of
his research. Similar rulings have been made by the Committee on
Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association.6 1
Though one might at first be led to conclude that the performance
of this obligation by an attorney amounts to an abdication of his
client's cause, it will be seen that this conclusion does not necessarily
follow. 'As attorney for an individual, counsel has an obligation to
render to his client ". . . the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land. .... ,, 62 But, as
was stated earlier, the attorney has another obligation which transcends
even the duty owing to the client-the obligation to be truthful, candid.
and fair to the court. When these two conflict, the'latter must pre-
vail. Actually, the disclosure of such adverse decisions may work to
the client's advantage. In the first place, it shows the court that his
attorney prepared and is willing to discuss authorities on both sides
of the question, fully and candidly; and, secondly, it allows his attorney
the opportunity to connent on and distinguish these adverse author-
ities from the instant case.0
It should be noted, however, that the rule advanced in the
Greenberg case could not, under any circumstances, be so interpreted
as to impose on the attorney the obligation to research both sides of
57 See nbte 23 supra.
58 Glebe Sugar Refining Co. v. Trustees of the Port and Harbours of
Greenocl,,.6$ S6o. JI 551 (House of Lords 1921).
66'Gleq.Sujar keffning 'Co., v. Trustees of the Port and Harbours of
Greenock, supra note 58, at 552 (dictum).60 Opinion 643, OPINIONS OF THE ComITTEEs oN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF
THE ASSOCIATION oF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF Nnw YoR'X AND THE NEW YoRK
COUNTY LAwYiRs' ASSOCIATION 369-70 (1956).
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a case. Rather he is expected to seek only authorities supporting the
cause which he espouses. However, if, in the course of his research,
he chances upon authority having a direct bearing on the case, though
adverse to his cause, it is then that this duty arises, and it is then
that he must disclose such authority to the court.
The limits of this duty to disclose adverse decisions are not as
yet clearly defined. The Committee on Ethics of the American Bar
Association has stated that this obligation is not limited to controlling
authorities.6 4  Chief Justice Vanderbilt has said it applies to "any
decisions in the State . . . ." 0 In view of these comments, it is still
unclear whether the duty of disclosure should extend to (1) decisions
of the lower courts within the jurisdiction, and (2) decisions of the
highest courts of other jurisdictions.
Conclusion
Thus, it would appear from what has been said that the courts
and the ethics committees do require complete disclosure as to both
facts and law. In the preparation of complaints and motions, in the
selection of jurors, the examination of witnesses, and in argument on
appeal, the attorney is confined within narrow limits. He may not
conceal existing relevant facts, nor may he present, as proven, facts
whose existence has not been clearly established. As to the law, the
attorney is duty bound to inform the court of all case law, within his
knowledge, which would be likely to influence the court's decision,
regardless of whether such cases support his client's cause. Though
performance of some of these duties may be considered by some to be
an undue burden upon the privilege of practicing law, they in reality
involve no more than a strict adherence to the basic principle of the
moral law which binds all men to the truth.
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